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Abstract
Mullainathan et al [Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2008] present a 
formalization of the concept of coarse thinking in the context of a model of 
persuasion. The essential idea behind coarse thinking is that people put 
situations into categories and the values assigned to attributes in a given 
situation are affected by the values of corresponding attributes in other co-
categorized situations.   We derive a new option pricing formula based on the 
assumption that the market consists of coarse thinkers as well as rational 
investors. The new formula, called the behavioral Black-Scholes formula is a 
generalization of the Black-Scholes formula. The new formula provides an 
explanation for the implied volatility skew puzzle in index options. In contrast 
with the Black-Scholes model, the implied volatility backed-out from the 
behavioral Black-Scholes formula is a constant. This finding suggests that the 
volatility skew (smile) may be a reflection of coarse thinking. That is, the skew is 
seen if rational investors are assumed to exist when actual investors are 
heterogeneous; coarse thinkers and rational investors.
Keywords: Coarse Thinking, Financial Options, Rational Pricing. Implied Volatility, 
Implied Volatility Skew, Implied Volatility Smile, Black-Scholes Model
JEL Classification: D00, G12
1Coarse Thinking and Pricing a Financial Option
In an interesting paper, Mullainathan, Schwartzstein & Shleifer (2008) formalize 
the notion of coarse thinking in the context of a model of persuasion. Their 
model is based on the notion that agents use analogies for assigning values to 
attributes (the attribute valued in their model is “quality”). The defining idea
behind coarse thinking is that agents co-categorize situations that they consider
to be analogous and assessment of attributes in a given situation is affected by 
other situations in the same category. This is in contrast with rational (Bayesian) 
thinking in which each situation is evaluated according to its own merits. Even 
though coarse thinking appears to be a natural way of modeling how humans
process information (Kahneman & Tversky (1982), Lakoff (1987), Edelmen (1992), 
Zaltman (1997), and Carpenter, Glazer, & Nakamoto (1994)), empirical evidence 
on the issue is difficult to gather because it is very difficult to isolate this effect 
from confounding factors. However, anecdotal evidence clearly points to it.
In fact, Mullainathan et al (2008) use the advertising theme of Alberto 
Culver Natural Silk Shampoo as a motivating example to explain coarse 
thinking. The shampoo was advertised with a slogan “We put silk in the bottle.” 
The company actually put some silk in the shampoo. However, as conceded by 
the company spokesman, silk does not do anything for hair (Carpenter et al 
(1994)). Then, why did the company put silk in the shampoo? Mullainathan et al 
(2008) write that the company was relying on the fact that consumers co-
categorize shampoo with hair. This co-categorization leads consumers to value 
“silk” in shampoo because they value “silky” in hair (clearly not a rational 
response). That is, a positive trait from hair is transferred to shampoo by adding 
silk to it. Such transfer of the informational content of an attribute across co-
categorized situations is termed transference.
2In this paper, we derive a new options pricing formula under the 
assumption that the market consists of coarse thinkers as well as rational 
investors. We call it, the behavioral Black-Scholes formula1, in contrast with the 
famous Black-Scholes formula derived under the assumption of rational 
investors.  One puzzling feature of the Black-Scholes formula is the appearance 
of a skew when volatilities (equity index) implied by the Black-Scholes formula 
are plotted against the striking price.  Theoretically, the implied volatility when 
plotted against the striking price should be a constant. The behavioral Black-
Scholes formula provides an explanation. The implied volatility backed-out from
the behavioral Black-Scholes model is a constant suggesting that the volatility 
skew is a reflection of coarse thinking. That is, the skew is seen if rational 
investors are assumed to exist when actual investors are heterogeneous; coarse 
thinkers as well as rational investors. Interestingly, the original Black-Scholes 
formula can be considered a special case of the behavioral Black-Scholes formula.  
The new formula reduces to the original formula if transference parameter takes a 
value equal to one (magnitude of transference goes to zero) or equivalently, if all 
investors become rational.
Despite early recognition of a key problem with the Black-Scholes formula 
(implied volatility skew), the formula remains perhaps one of the most widely 
used in the world; reasons being its ease of use and lack of an alternative. The 
behavioral Black-Scholes formula is a promising alternative since it is also easy to 
implement and can be considered a generalization of the original Black-Scholes 
formula.
Coarse thinking or analogy based reasoning is likely to play an important 
role in understanding financial market behavior. Many researchers have pointed 
out that there appears to be clear departures from Bayesian thinking (Babcock & 
Loewenstein (1997), Babcock, Wang, & Loewenstein (1996), Hogarth & Einhorn 
                                                
1 The term behavioral Black-Scholes is, at times, used to refer to models that explicitly allow for 
heterogeneous investor beliefs. Here, it refers to an option pricing formula which is obtained if some or all 
investors are allowed to be coarse thinkers.
3(1992), Kahneman & Frederick (2002), Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky (1982)). Such 
departures from rational thinking have been measured both at the individual as 
well as the market level (Siddiqi (2009), Kluger & Wyatt (2004)). However, the 
question of what type of behavior to allow for if non-Bayesian behavior is 
admitted is a difficult one to address in the absence of an alternative which is 
amenable to systematic analysis. Coarse thinking may provide such an 
alternative especially when the intuitive appeal of analogy based reasoning is 
undeniable.
Coarse thinking or analogy based reasoning appears to be extremely 
common in everyday life. It essentially makes the evaluation of new situations 
easier by making comparisons with familiar ones. Literature in psychology often 
considers associational or analogy based reasoning (Edelman (1992), Gilovich 
(1981), Kahneman and Tversky (1982), Lakoff (1987), Zaltman (1997)). In 
economics, an important recent contribution is Mullainathan et al (2008) where 
coarse thinking is formalized and a model of persuasion based on coarse 
thinking is developed. For ease of reference, we follow the formalization in 
Mullainathan et al (2008) as far as possible.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the hypothesis of 
rational pricing as well as the hypothesis of coarse thinking in the context of a 
three-state world, and derives each hypothesis’s price prediction. The new 
option pricing formula is derived in section 3 and its implications for implied 
volatility skew and portfolio optimization are discussed. Section 4 discusses the 
limits to arbitrage that may stop rational investors from arbitraging coarse 
thinkers out of the market. Section 5 discusses future research possibilities before 
concluding.
42. Rational Pricing vs. Coarse Thinking
The concept of rational pricing is based on the portfolio replication argument. 
The portfolio replication argument (also known as the law of one price) states 
that two portfolios with identical payoff structures must be identically priced. 
According to this principle, in order to price an asset, one only needs to find a 
portfolio that exactly replicates the payoffs of the asset. The price of the asset in 
question must then be equal to the cost of setting up the replicating portfolio. If 
this principle is violated then an arbitrage opportunity will arise. Needless to 
say, portfolio replication arguments form the heart of modern asset pricing 
theory. As one example, the Black-Scholes option pricing formula derived in 
Black, F., and Scholes, M. (1973) is an application of this principle. 
2.1 Rational Pricing
Consider a call option with payoffs 1C , 2C , and 3C corresponding to states Red 
(R), Blue (B), and Green (G) respectively. Three other assets 1B , 2B , and 3B with 
prices 1p , 2p , and 3p are available. Table 1 shows the payoffs associated with 
each asset in each state. All payoffs are non-negative.
Table 1
Price Asset Type State R State B State G
? Call 1C 2C 3C
1p 1B 1X 2X 3X
2p 2B 1Y 2Y 3Y
3p 3B Z Z Z
5In order to calculate the arbitrage-free price of the call option, consider a 
(replicating) portfolio consisting of a units of 1B , b units of 2B , and c units of 3B
such that:
111 CcZbYaX  , 222 CcZbYaX  , & 333 CcZbYaX 
Given such a (payoff replicating) portfolio, according to the portfolio replication 
argument, the arbitrage-free price of the call option is 321 cpbpap  .
Where 
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Hence, arbitrage-free price provides a sharply defined benchmark for rational 
pricing. This benchmark is the cornerstone of modern finance. It is important to 
note that the arbitrage-free price is independent of the risk preference of 
investors. Rational investors (irrespective of whether they are risk neutral, risk 
averse, or risk loving) must price the call option in the arbitrage-free manner.
However, even in simpler laboratory experiments, such as Rockenback (2004), 
where only two states of nature are allowed and significant learning 
opportunities are present, arbitrage-free hypothesis has been found to fare very 
poorly.
62.2 Option Pricing with Coarse Thinking
Suppose all three states are equally likely to occur.2 The price of any asset with 
coarse thinking depends on how it is categorized. Suppose the call option we 
have been considering has 1B as the underlying asset and has k as the striking 
price (a call option is an instrument that gives the buyer the right but not the 
obligation to purchase the underlying asset ( 1B in this case) at a specified price 
called the striking price k ). For simplicity, assume one period marked by two 
points in time. The current time is date 0 and the option yields a payoff (expires)
at date 1, at which point one of the three possible states is realized. It follows,
}0),max{( 11 kXC  , }0),max{( 22 kXC  , & }0),max{( 33 kXC 
As can be seen, the payoffs in the three states depend on the payoffs
from 1B in the corresponding states. Furthermore, by appropriately changing the 
striking price k , the call option can be made more or less similar to the 
underlying instrument 1B , with the similarity becoming exact as k approaches 
zero (all payoffs are constrained to be non-negative).
Next, we apply the coarse thinking model presented in Mullainathan et al 
(2008) to option pricing. For clarity, we follow the notation in Mullainathan et al 
(2008) as far as possible. Suppose an investor is interested in calculating the 
return on a given asset. We denote this return by Qq , whereQ is some subset of 
 (the set of real numbers). In calculating, the return of an asset, an investor 
faces, two similar, but not identical, observable situations, }1,0{s . In 0s , 
“return demanded on the call option” is the attribute of interest and in 1s , 
“actual return available on the underlying stock” is the attribute of interest. The 
                                                
2 Knowledge of the likelihood of states is needed to derive the coarse thinking price. This information is not 
required to derive the arbitrage-free price.
7investor has access to all the information in table 1. That is, table 1 is public 
information. We denote this public information by r .
Following the notation in Mullainathan et al (2008), the expected return 
demanded on the call option conditional on public information should be,
)(3
)}({)}({)}({
]0,|[
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(1)
The expected return demanded by a rational investor for investing in the call 
option is given by (1). In other words, the correct price of the call option as 
inferred by her is 321 cpbpap  (as explained in section 2.1). This is the price that 
a rational investor is willing to pay for this call option.
The actual expected return offered on the underlying stock is given by,
1
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Suppose a coarse thinker co-categorizes the call option with the 
underlying stock. That is, she forms a category or a group in which the call 
option is jointly considered with the underlying stock. Denoting this grouping 
byG , and following the notation in Mullainathan et al (2008) (equation (7) in 
their paper) closely, the expected return on the underlying stock demanded by 
the coarse thinker is,
]|1(]1,|[]|0(]0,|[]0,|[ GspsrqEGspsrqEsrqEG  (3)
In (3), )|1()|0( GspandGsp  are the probabilities assigned to each 
situation in the category G with 1)|1()|0(  GspGsp . Clearly, the inferred 
“correct” price of the call option is different for a coarse thinker when compared
8with a rational thinker since the expected return is now different. In general, the 
coarse thinker infers the “correct” price as the solution to the following equation 
for cp with cp denoting the price of the call option :
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(4a)
This is an example of transference. Here, the value of an attribute (expected 
return) in a co-categorized situation (underlying stock) is influencing the value of 
the expected return demanded in the situation (call option) under consideration.
If we assume that 1)|1(  Gsp , it follows,
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So, the coarse thinker infers the “correct” price of the call option from:
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It follows,
1
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Given co-categorization of the call option with the underlying stock ( 1B ), coarse 
thinkers choose a price for the option that equates the expected return on the 
option with the expected return on the underlying stock (transference). That is, the 
9attribute being transferred from the underlying stock to the call option is the 
expected return. A coarse thinker is solving for the price of the call option by 
analogy with the underlying stock. The underlying stock has a certain link 
between the payoffs and price, which is captured by the concept of expected 
return. While pricing with analogy, it makes sense to transfer the same link to the 
asset being priced.
The coarse thinking hypothesis provides a precisely defined alternative to 
the benchmark of rational pricing. For comparison, table 2 shows prices under 
both hypotheses.
Next, we depart from the simple three-state world, and explore how the Black-
Scholes formula would change if instead of assuming rational investors, both 
rational investors and coarse thinkers are assumed to co-exist. We will see that 
the new formula, which can be considered a generalization of the original Black-
Scholes formula, provides a potential solution to the volatility skew puzzle in 
equity index options.
3. The Generalization of the Black-Scholes Formula
Black. F, and Scholes, M.  (1973), and Merton R. (1973), in remarkable papers, 
independently put forward an option pricing model that paved the way for 
numerous advances in finance. Specifically, they came up with a way to price a 
Table 2
Call Option Price
Coarse Thinking Price Rational or Arbitrage-Free Price
1
321
321
p
XXX
CCC
pc 
 321 cpbpappc 
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financial option based on no-arbitrage arguments (that is, without appealing to 
risk preferences of the investors). The model revolutionized the world of finance 
and is now famously known as the Black-Scholes option pricing model.
Here, we first briefly sketch the standard derivation of the Black-Scholes 
formula so that the nature of the implied volatility puzzle becomes clear to the 
reader.3
In deriving the Black-Scholes formula, it is assumed that the price of the 
underlying follows a geometric Brownian motion:
SdZSdtdS   (6a)
where S is the stock price,  is a constant denoting the expected return on the 
underlying stock,  is a constant denoting the standard deviation of return, and 
dZ is a random variable which is an accumulation of a large number of 
independent random effects over an interval dt . dZ has a mean of zero. It can be 
shown that variance of dZ scales with the length of the time interval under 
consideration. The price of a call option (C) is then considered as a function of 
the underlying stock price (S) and time (t), that is, ),( tSfC  . Ito’s lemma leads 
to
dZS
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By using a portfolio replication argument, the Black-Scholes PDE is then derived:
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3 A reader interested in the formal derivation can consult any standard graduate text on derivative pricing.
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Equation (6c), with some variable transformations can be converted to a 
homogeneous heat equation, which can be solved with an appropriate boundary 
condition to yield the famous Black-Scholes formula:
)()( 2
)(
1 dKNedSNC
tTr  (6d)
where K is the striking price, r is the risk-free interest rate, N(.) is cumulative 
standard normal distribution, 
tT
tTrK
S
d
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 ))(2()ln(
2
1 , and 
tT
tTrK
S
d




 ))(2()ln(
2
2 .
The only unobservable in equation (6d) is  , the standard deviation of 
stock returns. By plugging in the observables, the value of  as implied by the 
observables can be backed out. One expects that if a number of call options are 
considered, each written on the same underlying, and having identical 
parameters such as expiry, and differing only in their striking prices, then their 
implied standard deviations should be identical.  After all, standard deviation of 
stock returns is a property of the underlying stock and similar call options 
written on the same underlying (differing only in striking prices) must reflect 
this fact. The implied volatility when plotted against the striking price must be a 
constant according to the Black-Scholes model as  is a constant in the model.
When  as implied by the market price of options written on the same 
equity index is plotted against the striking price, an interesting pattern is 
observed. In-the-money call options are found to have a higher implied volatility 
compared to at-the-money and out-of-the-money options. Figure (1) shows a 
typical pattern for S&P-500 equity index options. Similar patterns are observed 
for other equity index options (such as Nikkei and Dow Jones). The shape is that 
12
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Figure 1
of a smile skewed to the left, hence, the name volatility skew. Why do we 
observe this pattern? Clearly, this pattern is indicating a problem with the Black-
Scholes model as  is a constant in the model.
Next, we show how a modified Black-Scholes model that allows for coarse 
thinking provides a potential explanation for the implied volatility skew.
3.1 Modified Black-Scholes Model with Coarse Thinking
The intuition behind the coarse thinking approach as applied to the pricing of 
financial options is as follows: If investors want to find the value of something 
(which probably is relatively less liquid), they try to find something similar and 
more liquid and see how it is priced. Since a call option is the right to buy the 
underlying, therefore while valuing call options, coarse thinkers consider how 
the underlying instrument is priced. That is, coarse thinkers co-categorize a call 
option with its underlying instrument and price it with transference from the 
underlying. Next, we formalize this intuition.
We follow the notation in section 2.2 as far as possible. As in section 2.2, 
let q denote the return on a given asset. In calculating, the return of an asset, 
13
investors face, two similar, but not identical, observable situations, }1,0{s . 
In 0s , “return on the call option” is the attribute of interest and in 1s , “return 
on the underlying stock” is the attribute of interest. Let I denote the information 
set. 
For a rational investor, the expected return on the underlying stock
follows from equation (6a):
SdtIdSEsIqE  ]|[]1,|[ (6e)
For a rational investor, the expected return on the call option follows from 
equation (6b):
dtS
S
C
S
S
C
t
C
IdCEsIqE }2/1{]|[]0,|[ 22
2
2




 (6f)
For a coarse thinker, who co-categorizes a call option with its underlying 
stock, and prices it in transference with the underlying, the expected return on the 
call option is:
SdtIdSEsIqEsIqEC  ]|[]1,|[]0,|[ (6g)
If the market consists of both types of investors, and the frequency of rational 
investors is a (so the frequency of coarse thinkers is a1 ), then the resulting 
expected return on the call option is given by,
dtaSadtS
S
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S
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IdCEsIqE CC )1(}2/1{]|[]0,|[ 22
2
2


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
  (6h)
where we have chosen superscript “c” to denote a market in which coarse 
thinkers are also present along with the rational investors.
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Another formulation is as follows. The market only consists of coarse thinkers 
(that is, there are no rational investors) and the coarse thinkers, co-categorize the 
call option with its underlying stock, with the situation weights given 
by asp  )0( and asp  1)1( , 10  a , the expected return on the call 
option is then:
)1(]1,|[)0(]0,|[]0,|[  spsIqEspsIqEsIqE C (7a)
From equations (6e) and (6f) and (7a), it follows,
dtaSadtS
S
C
S
S
C
t
C
IdCEsIqE CC )1(}2/1{]|[]0,|[ 22
2
2




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(7b) is identical to (6h), however, we prefer the earlier formulation over the latter 
one, as the simultaneous presence of rational as well as coarse thinkers allows us
to consider if rational investors can arbitrage coarse thinkers out of the market.  
This question is considered in section 4, where we discuss the limits to arbitrage 
that prevent the rational investors from making arbitrage profits. 
We conjecture that greater is the similarity between a call option and its 
underlying stock, lower is the value of parameter a . The notion of similarity can 
be precisely defined by the ratio S
K , where K is the striking price and S is the 
price of the underlying. 
Conjecture 1 As the money-ness of a call option increases ( S
K falls), the effect of 
coarse thinking strengthens, that is, a falls, and as the money-ness of a call option 
decreases ( S
K rises), the effect of coarse thinking weakens, that is, a rises.
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As can be seen from equation (6h), coarse thinkers modify the deterministic 
component of the stochastic process followed by a call option by co-categorizing 
it with its underlying stock. The postulated stochastic process followed by the 
call option when coarse thinkers and rational investors co-exist is (see Appendix 
C for formal treatment):
dZS
S
C
dtSaaS
S
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dC }{})1(2/1{ 22
2
2
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
 (7c)
Comparison of equation (7c) and equation (6b) is in order here. The random or 
stochastic component in the two equations is exactly identical. Coarse thinkers 
alter the deterministic component of the return (the co-efficient in front of dt ) by 
co-categorizing the call option with its underlying stock as equation (6h) shows. 
That is, if we apply the expectations operator across the stochastic equation for a 
call option, equation (6h) should be recovered if the market consists of coarse 
thinkers as well as rational investors. And, if the market consists of rational 
investors only, equation (6f) should be recovered.
Proposition 1 gives us the associated Partial Differential Equation (PDE) when 
both coarse thinkers and rational investors are present.
Proposition 1  If the stochastic process followed by the price of a call option is 
given by equation ( 7c), then the associated PDE for option’s price is 
0
)1(
}
)1(
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2
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t
C  (8)
where 10  a
Proof: See Appendix A.
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Note, if 1a , there are no coarse thinkers, and as expected, equation (8) reduces 
to equation (6c). Lower the value of a , greater is the difference between the 
coarse thinking PDE and the Black-Scholes PDE.
It is well known that the Black-Scholes PDE is reducible to a homogenous 
heat equation. The behavioral Black-Scholes PDE (equation (8)), on the other 
hand, is reducible to an inhomogeneous heat equation, as proposition 2 shows.
Proposition 2 The behavioral Black-Scholes PDE (equation (8)) is reducible to an 
inhomogeneous heat equation with appropriate variable transformations.
Proof.  Start by making the following substitutions in (8): 
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With these substitutions in equation (8) and replacing S with xKe , it follows,
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Now, make the substitution, WeV x   in equation (10) where 
2
12  q , 
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Equation (11) is similar to an inhomogeneous heat equation.
▄
Note that in equation (11) if 1a , it becomes a homogeneous heat equation. 
Of course, this is exactly what we expect since when 1a , there no coarse 
thinkers to cause price distortions and the original Black-Scholes equation is 
recovered. 
Proposition 3 describes the behavioral Black-Scholes formula.
Proposition 3 The solution to the behavioral PDE (equation (8)) is 
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(.)N is cumulative standard normal distribution.
Proof.  Solving equation (11) by using Duhamel’s principle and substituting to 
recover original variables leads to the behavioral Black-Scholes formula 
(equation (12)). Steps are shown in Appendix B.
Corollary 3.1 If a=1, the behavioral Black-Scholes formula (equation (12)) 
reduces to the original Black-Scholes formula (equation (6d)).
Proof. By comparison.
The behavioral Black-Scholes formula derived in this paper can be considered a 
generalization of the original Black-Scholes formula. The original formula 
(equation (6d)) is a limiting or a special case of the behavioral Black-Scholes 
formula (equation (12)), which is recovered if 1a .
3.2  Implications of the Behavioral Black-Scholes formula for Implied Volatility
The behavioral Black-Scholes formula (equation (12)) provides a potential 
solution to the volatility skew puzzle in equity index options. Understanding the 
behavior of parameter a is the key. It controls the relative price impact of rational 
investors vs. coarse thinkers in the market. )1( a captures the strength of 
transference from the underlying instrument to the call option due to the 
presence of coarse thinkers. It specifies how the expected return on the 
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underlying instrument spills over to the expected return on the call option. 
Lower the value of a , higher is the strength of transference. Transference 
disappears when 1a . It is natural to expect that greater the similarity between 
a call option and its underlying, greater will be the strength of transference from 
the underlying to the call option. As a call option becomes more and more in-the-
money, its similarity with the underlying increases. Consequently, in accordance 
with conjecture 1, a should decrease in value as a call option becomes more and
more in-the-money. 
In the original Black-Scholes model, a typical relationship between 
implied volatility and the striking price for call options on S&P-500 index is 
shown in figure (1). The behavioral Black-Scholes formula has two additional 
unobservables apart from  .  These are transference )(a and expected return on 
the underlying . The unobservables  and are constant whereas 
transference )(a varies as the similarity between the call and its underlying is 
varied.  We conjectured that as the similarity between the call and its underlying 
(money-ness of the call option) increases, transference becomes stronger. That is, 
a falls as S
K falls. 
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Figure 2 shows the implied volatility plot of the behavioral Black-Scholes 
vs. original Black-Scholes. Table 3 shows values of a that are used in generating 
the implied volatility plot of the behavioral Black-Scholes model. As can be seen 
from the table, as the call option becomes more and more in-the-money, the 
value of a declines. 
Table 3
Transference getting stronger (‘a’ declining) as call becomes more “in-the-money”
Strike/Index Value of Parameter ‘a’
0.90 0.748
0.92 0.757
0.94 0.774
0.96 0.803
0.98 0.823
1.00 0.858
1.02 0.915
1.04 0.933
1.06 0.949
1.08 0.974
As can be seen from figure 2, with values of parameter a chosen in
accordance with the conjecture, the implied volatility in the behavioral Black-
Scholes model is a constant. Instead, what varies in the behavioral Black-Scholes 
model is the strength of transference. 
Black-Scholes model is based on the assumption that markets consist of 
perfectly rational investors. We essentially argue that market also has its share of 
coarse thinkers and by assuming only perfectly rational investors; an error is 
introduced in the model. Implied volatility skew is a reflection of this error, 
which is corrected once coarse thinking is incorporated into the model.
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The expected return demanded by a rational investor on a call option is 
always higher than the expected return on the underlying. For a coarse thinker 
the same is true. However, the expected return demanded by her on a call option 
is always lower than what a rational investor would demand. As expected return 
and price are inversely related, a coarse thinker is willing to pay a higher price 
than a rational investor. Consequently, if the market also has coarse thinkers, the 
original Black-Scholes model over-estimates implied volatility. However, as the 
“money-ness” of the call option declines, the value of a rises or approaches 1. As 
a approaches 1, the impact of coarse thinkers on call’s price vanishes, and the 
Black-Scholes implied volatility approaches the behavioral Black-Scholes implied 
volatility. The slope of the implied volatility plot for a behavioral Black-Scholes 
model is always zero. So, the “correct value” of implied volatility can be inferred 
from the implied volatility plot of the original Black-Scholes as the point where 
the slope is closest to zero. This leads to the following remark.
Remark 1: The correct value of implied volatility as seen in the Black-
Scholes model for call options written on equity indices is at the striking price 
where the slope of the implied volatility plot is closest to zero.
A practical issue is which value of implied volatility to use while pricing exotic 
options (options on options). Remark 1 provides a potential solution to this 
problem by providing a mechanism for selecting the correct value.
3.3 Creating Optimal Portfolios
Various partial derivatives of option prices, known as the Greeks, are frequently 
used in setting up optimal portfolios. The Greeks enter as constraints in a typical 
optimization problem involving a portfolio of options. For example, the first 
partial of an option’s price with respect to the underlying is called delta. A delta 
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neutral portfolio is one in which the constraint is to have portfolio delta equal to 
zero. Similarly, the second partial of an option’s price with respect to the 
underlying is called gamma. A portfolio which is both delta and gamma neutral 
has two constraints which are satisfied simultaneously (portfolio delta and 
portfolio gamma are equal to zero).  Essentially, the Greeks are used to control 
for risk because the constraints are usually expressed in terms of Greeks in 
portfolio optimization.
The Greeks associated with the behavioral Black-Scholes formula are 
different than the Greeks of the original Black-Scholes formula. If the market 
also has coarse thinkers, then the correct values for Greeks are those that are 
inferred from equation (12). It follows that, if the market also has coarse 
thinkers, then the portfolio optimization programs need to be adjusted 
accordingly. Table 4 shows two of the most commonly used Greeks under the 
two models. Of course, if 1a , the difference disappears.
Table 4
The Greeks
Greek Behavioral Black-Scholes Original Black-Scholes
Delta : 
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4. The Limits to Arbitrage
If coarse thinkers and rational investors co-exist, a pertinent question is, can 
rational investors make arbitrage profits at the expense of coarse thinkers? If yes, 
then coarse thinkers would be driven out of the market, and coarse thinking 
would not matter for option pricing. 
There are two cases to consider; investment horizon shorter than the 
expiry of the option, and investment horizon equal to the expiry of the option. If 
rational investors have a horizon shorter than the expiry of the option, then they 
can make arbitrage profits if the price distortion caused by the coarse thinkers 
disappears predictably before the option expires. If their horizon is till the expiry 
of the option, then they can make arbitrage profits if they can create a replicating 
portfolio with payoffs equal to that of the call option at expiry, and at a lower 
cost.
To include the two above mentioned cases, consider a simple model with 
three points in time; 1, 2, and 3. At time 1, the price of the call option according to 
rational investors is rP and the price that the coarse thinkers are willing to pay 
is cP . For concreteness, we assume rc PP  .  The actual market price deviates 
from rP due to the presence of coarse thinkers to   cr PaPaV  11 , where 
 a1 captures the intensity of coarse thinking.  At time 2, the intensity of coarse 
thinking may either increase or diminish. If it increases, then the price will 
further deviate from the rational price. If it diminishes, the price will approach 
the rational price. Consequently, at time 1, a rational investor with a horizon 
limited to time 2, cannot be sure about his best strategy. If he thinks, that the 
intensity of coarse thinking will diminish, it may be optimal for him to sell call 
options.  Otherwise, he may want to hold on till time 2 for further capital gains.  
At time 3, both coarse thinkers and rational investors value the call option 
at   0,max3 KSV  . So, a rational investor with a horizon till time 3, needs to do 
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the following to make arbitrage profits: write a call option at time 1 and buy a 
replicating portfolio simultaneously.  Let rPR 1 denote the value of the 
replicating portfolio at time 1. By definition of a replicating portfolio, its value at 
time 3 is 33 VR  . Let c denote the transaction cost of setting up the replicating 
portfolio, so time 1 payoff is cRV  11 , and time 3 payoff is 03333  VVRV .
Arbitrage profits exist if,
cRV  11 .
However, at time 3, there are infinitely many payoff states, each corresponding 
to one particular value of S.  Even if we admit a finite number of states, the 
replicating portfolio must have a large number of assets (number of assets must 
be equal to the number of states).  So, the transaction costs involved in setting up 
a replicating portfolio are likely be significantly larger than the price deviation 
rational investor are trying to benefit from.  Hence, limits to arbitrage, may 
prevent rational investors from making arbitrage profits at the expense of coarse 
thinkers.
5. Future Research Possibilities and Conclusions
Implied volatility of an index option is a plot skewed to the left. However, the 
implied volatilities of individual stocks typically resemble a symmetric smile. 
That is, an in-the-money call as well as an out-of-the-money call has a higher 
implied volatility when compared with an at-the-money call. An immediate 
research possibility is in explaining the symmetric smile. We conjecture that a 
call option on an individual company stock is not only co-categorized with its 
underlying but also with an appropriate (sector wise) equity index. One may 
argue that for an in-the-money call, transference with the underlying is stronger 
because an in-the-money call is more similar to the underlying stock, whereas, 
for an out-of-the-money call transference with the equity index is stronger 
because an out-of-the-money call is less similar to the underlying (in falling 
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markets, people pay more attention to macro-factors, which are better reflected 
in a broader equity index). Since both types of transferences decrease expected 
return on the call option (stocks and indices have lower expected returns than 
corresponding call option), prices of in-the-money and out-of-the-money calls are 
higher than what they would have been in the absence of transference. 
Consequently, the Black-Scholes model that ignores transference generates a 
smile that is symmetric. 
One may also conjecture that greater the number of co-categorized 
situations, higher should be the slope of the smile in absolute value since the 
weight given to the situation 0s is likely to fall as the number of co-categorized 
situations increase. As the weight given to 0s falls, the price of the call option 
rises (the expected return falls due to stronger cumulative transference from a 
number of co-categorized situations). Higher the price of the call, higher is the 
implied volatility from the Black-Scholes model. So, if coarse thinking model is 
correct then the magnitude of the slope from an index option should be lower 
than the magnitude of the slope from an option written on an individual 
company stock. This prediction can be tested with careful examination of the 
data.
Exchange rate options are even more interesting since co-categorization 
possibilities here also include key macro-economic variables behind the two 
currencies.
Essentially, the coarse thinking approach requires a change in perspective. 
Typically, the Black-Scholes model is used (wherever applicable) to price all sorts 
of derivative instruments without much regard to context.  Coarse thinking 
approach, on the other hand, draws life from a particular context. It is, after all, a 
particular context that gives rise to a specific co-categorization. That means, a 
new option pricing formula is needed for each context.  As co-categorization 
changes (for example, when exchange rate options are considered), the option 
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pricing formula also changes. Deriving these context specific formulas is a 
subject of future research.
Economics is primarily a study of how people make decisions. The 
traditional paradigm that assumes that people act as if they are emotionless 
geniuses while making decisions, is now gradually giving way to alternative 
approaches that admit limits on reasoning ability. However, saying that there are 
limits on reasoning ability is far from enough. The actual challenge is to provide 
a theory of where do these limits originate from. An associated challenge is to 
show empirically that these limits actually matter in decision making.  Coarse 
thinking hypothesis is a reflection of ideas from such diverse fields as 
psychology, linguistics, marketing, advertising, and politics. It is a powerful and 
highly intuitive idea with very interesting implications. 
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Appendix A
Consider a trading strategy in which one holds a call option and shorts 
S
C


of the 
underlying. The value of such a portfolio at a particular point in time t is,
S
CSC 

At a later time, say, dtt  , the value of the portfolio may change. Let d denote the 
change in portfolio value over the interval  dttt , . That is,
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(A2) is risk free since there is no dZ term in (A2). Let r be the risk free rate of return. On 
the portfolio , the return over dt should be dtr in order to eliminate arbitrage. So,
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Appendix B
Equation (11) is similar to an inhomogeneous heat equation which can be solved by 
applying the Duhamel’s principle.  We need to solve,
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s.t. the initial condition
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Duhamel’s principle says that the solution to the initial value problem (B1 & B2) is given 
by
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and );,( sxg  solves :
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The fundamental solution to the heat equation in one dimension (our case) is given by
 
oo
h
xox
h dxxWexW )0(
2
1
),( ,4
2








Change of a variable: 




22
oo dx
dz
xx
z
Also, 0)0,( xW h iff 0x , so we can restrict the integration range: 


2
x
z
   











 



 


2
2
12
2
2
12
2
2
2
2
1
),(
zx
q
zx
q
x
zh eedzexW

   
21
2
2
12
2
2
2
2
12
2
2
),(
2
1
2
1
),(
22
IIxW
dzeedzeexW
h
zx
q
x
zzx
q
x
zh






 





 

  
Complete the square for the exponent in 1I :
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Similarly, complete the square for the exponent in 2I to arrive at
So, )()(),( 21 dNedNexW dch  (B4)
(B4) needs to be adjusted for inhomogeneity in accordance with Duhamel’s principle. 
We need to solve,
2
2
x
gg



, for s
s.t. sxe
a
a
ssxg 
 



  )1(
2
)1(2
);,(    , s
General solution: 
 
oo
xox
dxsxgexg )(
2
1
),( ,4
2








Change of a variable: 




22
oo dx
dz
xx
z
   






 









 


s
a
rq
zx
q
z
edzef
2
2
2
2
4
12
2
2
12
2
2
1 

(B5)
where 
2
2)1(


a
a
f

   
4
12
2
12
2
12
2
)(
2
222




 

 qxqdandqxdwheredNeI d
33
Complete the square for the exponent:
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Substitute (B4) and (B6) in (B3):
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Substitute for original variables to obtain the behavioral Black-Scholes formula:
         11)()( 1211   Qa tTaa tTra tTa eQeSfdNKedNSeC

        )(11)( 211 dNKeeQfdNSeC a tTrQa tTa  
where,
10  a
2
)1(2


a
a
f





 
a
ra
q
a
rq
Q
22
2 )1(
;
2
4
)12(



)(
2
2
tT  
 
2
12
2
1


 qxd
 
2
12
2
2


 qxd
35
Appendix C
Change in stock price is given by
SdZSdtdS   (C1)
where 0][ dZE . That is,
SdtdSE ][ (C2)
dZ is an accumulation of independent random effects over time dt . According to central 
limit theorem, its behavior is completely characterized by a normal distribution; that is by 
its mean and standard deviation. 
Variance of a random variable which is an accumulation of independent random effects 
over a time interval dt is proportional to the length of the time interval. That is,
dtdZVar
dtdZVar


][
][
It follows, 
dtndZ ~ where n is a standard normal variable with a mean equal to zero and a
standard deviation equal to one.
The price of a call option, C , is some function of tandS . That is, ),( tSfC  . So, 
change inC over time interval dt , if the market consists of rational investors, is given by 
qdZpdtdC  (C3)
where the values of qandp are deduced from Ito’s lemma:
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Since 0][ dZE , 
pdtdCE ][ (C4)
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The coarse thinking hypothesis postulates that investors co-categorize a call option with 
its underlying stock in the following way,
][][ dSEdCE c  (C5)
Introduce a transference parameter a , with values between 0 and 1, such that the intensity 
of coarse thinking is given by  a1 . That is, lower the value of a , stronger is the 
transference from the underlying stock to the market price of the call option. 
By substituting (C2) and (C4) in (C5) and introducing transference:
dtaSpadCE c )}1({][  
So, if the market also consists of coarse thinkers, change in C over time interval dt is 
given by
qdZdtaSpadC
qdZdCEdC c


)}1({
][

(C6)
